Tokenomics Conference
Upcoming
Tokenomics 2026
November 2026
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Past Conferences
Tokenomics 2024
Day 1 – December 6
Session 1: Crisis in Crypto
- From CeFi to DeFi: What Does Investor (Mis)trust?
- How Crises Impact Stablecoin Trading Behaviors?
Session 2: DEX and Market Efficiency
- Does Market Efficiency Impact Capital Allocation Efficiency? The Case of Decentralized Exchanges
- Cryptocurrency Listings on Cryptocurrency Exchanges
- Computation of Optimal MEV in Decentralized Exchanges
- On-chain Optimal Aggregation of Uniswap v3 Clones
Keynote
Lin William Cong, Cornell University
Session 3: Mechanism Design and Token Issuance
- Market Power and Loyalty Redeemable Token Design
- Proophi: A ZKP Market Mechanism
- Sealed-bid Auctions on Blockchain with Timed Commitment Outsourcing
Session 4: Token Prices and Blockchain Implications
- Cultural Value in Digital Art: Evidence from CryptoPunks
- The Financialization of Cryptocurrencies
- Blockchains for Environmental Monitoring: Theory and Empirical Evidence from China
Day 2 – December 7
Keynote
Agostino Capponi, Columbia University
Session 5: Economics of AMM
- The Economics of Constant Function Market Makers
- Price Discovery in Cryptocurrency Markets: Trades versus Liquidity Provision
- CLVR Ordering of Transactions on AMMs
- Optimal Automated Market Makers
Additional Keynote Speakers and Panelists
Ari Juels, Cornell Tech
Julien Prat, École Polytechnique
Daisuke Araya, Keio University
Yuya Ishikawa, Gaudiy
Tokenomics 2023
Day 1 – Friday, October 27
Keynote
Philipp Strack, Yale University
Session 1: DEXs
- Augmenting Batch Exchanges with Constant Function Market Makers
- An Economic Model of a Decentralized Exchange with Concentrated Liquidity
- The Geometry of Constant Function Market Makers
Session 2: Lending and Interest Rates
- Stablecoin Devaluation Risk
- Phantom Liquidity in Decentralized Lending
- Inflation Expectation and Cryptocurrency Investment
Session 3: Governance
- Balancing Power in Decentralized Governance: Quadratic Voting under Imperfect Information
- Will Blockchains Disintermediate Platforms? Limits to Decentralization in DAOs
- Token-Based Platform Governance
Day 2 – Saturday, October 28
Keynote
Scott Kominers, Harvard University
Session 4: Security
- Speculative Denial-of-Service Attacks in Ethereum
- MEV Makes Everyone Happy under Greedy Sequencing Rule
- Undetectable Selfish Mining
Session 5: Empirics of Blockchain
- Mempool: The Antechamber to the Blockchain
- Liquidity Fragmentation on Decentralized Exchanges
- Estimating Investor Preferences for Blockchain Security
Tokenomics 2022
Day 1 – Monday, December 12
Session 1: MEV and Front-Running
- Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
- The Evolution of Blockchain: From Public to Private Mempools
- Commitment Against Front-Running Attacks
Session 2: DeFi
- The Need for Fees at a DEX: How Increases in Fees Can Increase DEX Trading Volume
- Interest Rate Parity in Decentralized Finance
- Token Incentives and Platform Competition: A Tale of Two Swaps
Invited Talk
Hanna Halaburda, NYU Stern School of Business
Session 3: Blockchain, CBDC and Payments
- The Demand for Programmable Payments
- CBDC and Payment Platform Competition
- Central Bank Digital Currency and Banking Choice: The Impact of Service Location
Day 2 – Tuesday, December 13
Invited Talk: Regulating Crypto-assets and Experimenting CBDC: Two Sides of the Same Coin
Claudine Hurman, Banque de France
Session 4: Smart Contracts, Oracles and AMMs
- Axioms for Constant Function AMMs
- Consistency of Automated Market Makers
- An Impossibility Theorem on Truth-Telling in Fully Decentralized Systems
Invited Talk: Algorithmic Game Theory and Blockchains
Elias Koutsoupias, University of Oxford
Session 5: Efficiency of Blockchain Protocols
- Equilibrium Staking Levels in a Proof-of-Stake Blockchain
- Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Protection on a DAG
- An Economic Model of Consensus on Distributed Ledgers
- QPQ 1DLT: A System for the Rapid Deployment of Secure and Efficient EVM-Based Blockchains
Tokenomics 2021
Day 1 – Thursday, November 18
Keynote: Distributed Computing Meets Game Theory: Fault Tolerance and Implementation with Cheap Talk
Joseph Halpern, Cornell University
Session 1: Role of Consensus Protocol in Stability and Scalability of Blockchains
- Why Bitcoin Will Fail to Scale?: Economics of Collusion on Bitcoin
- Economic Implications of Scaling Blockchains: Why the Consensus Protocol Matters
- General Congestion Attack on HTLC-Based Payment Channel Networks
- Tuning PoW with Hybrid Expenditure
Session 2: Safety of Digital Decentralized Payments
- On Cryptocurrency Wallet Design
- 17/WAKU2-RLNRELAY: Privacy-Preserving Peer-to-Peer Economic Spam Protection
- Secure Computation with Non-equivalent Penalties in Constant Rounds
Keynote: Mechanism Design for the Blockchain Transaction-Fee Market
David Parkes, Harvard University
Session 3: Design and Usage of Tokens
- Best Before? Expiring Central Bank Digital Currency and Loss Recovery
- Optimal Design of Tokenized Markets
- Token-Based Platforms and Speculators
- To Infinity and Beyond: Financing Platforms with Uncapped Crypto Tokens
Day 2 – Friday, November 19
Session 4: Information Frictions in Crypto Markets
- Crypto Wash TradingBest Paper Award
- Competition and Product Quality: Fake Trading on Crypto Exchanges
- Transparency and Learning in Decentralized Finance
Session 5: Market Automation Enabled by Smart Contracts
- Decentralized Stablecoins and Collateral Risk
- Infinite but Rare: Valuation and Pricing in Marketplaces for Blockchain-Based Nonfungible Tokens
- The Conceptual Flaws of Constant Product Automated Market Making
- Coexisting Exchange Platforms: Limit Order Books and Automated Market Makers
Keynote: Blockchain and Privacy
Catherine Tucker, MIT
Session 6: Arbitrage in Decentralized Exchanges
- Decentralized Exchanges
- Loss and Slippage in Networks of Automated Market Makers
- The Adoption of Blockchain-Based Decentralized Exchanges
Panel: Importance of Connecting between Fields in Blockchain Research
Jacob Leshno, University of Chicago
Maria Potop-Butucaru, Sorbonne University
Ken Rogoff, Harvard University
Fahad Saleh, Wake Forest University
Amy Whitaker, New York University
Moderated by Hanna Halaburda, New York University
Tokenomics 2020
Day 1 – Monday, October 26
Keynote: When Nakamoto Meets Nash: Blockchain Breakthrough through the Lens of Game Theory
Ittai Abraham, VMware Research
Keynote: Digital Currencies as Types
Timothy Zakian, Novi, Facebook
Presentations
- Rational vs Byzantine Players in Consensus-Based Blockchains
- Decentralization in Open Quorum Systems
- On Fairness in Committee-Based Blockchains
- Reversible and Composable Financial Contracts
- Game Theoretical Analysis of Cross-Chain Swaps
- Proof of Behavior: Design of LEMobiCoin
- The Structure of Cryptocurrency Returns
- Cryptocurrencies, Currency Competition, and the Impossible Trinity
- VeriOSS: Using the Blockchain to Foster Bug Bounty Programs
- Why Fixed Costs Matter for Proof-of-Work Based Cryptocurrencies
- Getting Blockchain Incentives Right
Day 2 – Tuesday, October 27
Keynote: On Inclusive Open Finance in the Digital Age
Long Chen, Luohan Academy
Keynote: Some Economics of Fintech
Jean Tirole, Toulouse School of Economics
Presentations
- Fundamental Pricing of Utility Tokens
- A Foundation for Ledger Structures
- Parasite Chain Detection in the IOTA Protocol
- Welcome to the Jungle: A Reference Model for Blockchain, DLT and Smart Contracts
- Smart Contracts, IoT Sensors and Efficiency: Automated Execution vs. Better Information
- Token-Based Platform Finance
- Product Market Competition with Crypto Tokens and Smart Contracts
- Implementation Study of Two Verifiable Delay Functions
- From Hotelling to Nakamoto: The Economic Meaning of Bitcoin Mining
- Bitcoin's Fatal Flaw: The Limited Adoption Problem
- Blockguard: Adaptive Blockchain Security
Ethereum France – Kaiko Prize 2020
Amin Shams, Ohio State University, for "The Structure of Cryptocurrency Returns"
Tokenomics 2019
Day 1 – Monday, May 6
Session 1: Consensus
- The Stability and the Security of the Tangle
- Selfish Mining and Dyck Words in Bitcoin and Ethereum Networks
- The Gap Game
- Democratising Blockchain: A Minimal Agency Consensus Model
Invited Talk: Demystifying Blockchains: Decentralized and Fault-Tolerant Storage for the Future of Big Data?
Amr El Abbadi, University of California Santa Barbara
Session 2: Smart Contracts and Applications
- Atomic Appends: Selling Cars and Coordinating Armies with Multiple Distributed Ledgers
- B-CoC: A Blockchain-Based Chain of Custody for Evidences Management in Digital Forensics
- A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation
- An Empirical Study of Speculative Concurrency in Ethereum Smart Contracts
Invited Talk: Tokenomics: Asset Pricing and Corporate Finance in the Platform Economy
Lin William Cong, University of Chicago Booth School of Business
Session 3: Initial Coin Offerings
- Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity
- Entrepreneurial Incentives and the Role of Initial Coin Offerings
- Financial Incentives for Open Source Development: The Case of Blockchain
- Funding New Ventures with Digital Tokens: Due Diligence and Token Tradability
Day 2 – Tuesday, May 7
Session 4: Cryptography and Security
- MixEth: Efficient, Trustless Coin Mixing Service for Ethereum
- A Smart Contract Oracle for Approximating Real-World, Real Number Values
- The Impact of Ethereum Throughput and Fees on Transaction Latency During ICOs
Invited Talk: Flexible BFT: Separating BFT Protocol Design from the Fault Model
Dahlia Malkhi, VMware Research
Session 5: Cryptocurrencies
- Pitfalls of Bitcoin's Proof-of-Work: R&D Arms Race and Mining Centralization
- Decentralized Mining in Centralized Pools
- Currency Substitution under Transaction Costs
- The Economics of Cryptocurrencies – Bitcoin and Beyond
Invited Talk: Equilibrium Bitcoin Pricing
Catherine Casamatta, Toulouse School of Economics
Session 6: Incentives
- Towards a Functional Fee Market for Cryptocurrencies
- Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach
- F1 Fee Distribution
Asseth – Kaiko Prize for Research in Cryptoeconomics
William George and Clément Lesaege, Kleros Cooperative, for "A Smart Contract Oracle for Approximating Real-World, Real Number Values"